1
Mr. Hill files this motion to correct the lack of an electronicsignature in his original Motion for Reconsideration and Setting
Aside of Order Dismissing Complaint and Denying Preliminary
Temporary Injunction. Doc. 41.
-1-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 4:06-cv-00032-SPM
CLARENCE EDWARD HILL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
JAMES MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF )
THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ) EMERGENCY APPLICATION:
CORRECTIONS, ) CAPITAL CASE, DEATH
in his official capacity; ) WARRANT SIGNED; EXECUTION
) IMMINENT. September 20,
) 2006 at 6:00 p.m.
and )
)
CHARLES J. CRIST, JR., ATTORNEY )
GENERAL, )
in his official capacity )
)
Defendant(s). )
___________________________________)
CORRECTED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SETTING ASIDE OF ORDER
DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DENYING PRELIMINARY TEMPORARY
INJUNCTION
1COMES NOW
the Plaintiff, Clarence Hill, and moves this Courtto reconsider its Order Dismissing Complaint rendered September
1, 2006. Plaintiff respectfully argues that this Court has
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 1 of 24
2
Mr. Hill in an abundance of caution has attached Plaintiff’sMotion for Temporary Injunction to Stay His Execution Scheduled
for September 20, 2006 at 6:00 p.m. filed Friday, August 31,
2006. Undersigned in reviewing the CM/ECF website prior to the
filing of this motion inexplicably could not locate the document
on the docket report.
-2-
misapprehended and mistaken several issues of law and fact that
led to an erroneous ruling when it dismissed Mr. Hill’s Amended
Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Injunction to Stay His Execution
Scheduled for September 20, 2006 at 6:00 p.m.
2, and grantedDefendant(s) Amended Motion to Dismiss.
Mr. Hill will contend in this motion that several errors
were present and concerns raised in this Court’s Order Dismissing
Complaint. Mr. Hill presents argument that although Mr. Hill has
not been dilatory, this Court has conflated and confused the
legal significance of dilatoriness and the corresponding analyses
applicable to the motion to dismiss and a stay of execution.
Further argument is provided that Mr. Hill should be allowed to
litigate the merits of his claims - even if a stay of execution
is not granted - an opportunity that has proved valuable and
meaningful in other jurisdictions. Additionally, Mr. Hill notes
at this point he still has not been specifically informed as to
the procedure that will be utilized to execute him. In support of
his position, Mr. Hill states:
I. PLAINTIFF’S DILIGENCE IN PURSUING HIS CLAIM
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 2 of 24
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In denying Mr. Hill relief this Court found that “Moreover,
Florida’s lethal injection methods were subjected to a full
evidentiary hearing in 2000 in
Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla.2000), and Hill could have challenged the procedure after the
Sims
decision was rendered.” Order Dismissing Complaint, at 7.This Court then goes on to state, “Hill has offered no reason for
his delay in bringing a §1983 action until just days before his
execution. Therefore, under the authority of
Gomez, Nelson, andHill
, this Court finds that Hill has delayed unnecessarily inbringing his §1983 challenge of Florida’s lethal injection
procedure, and his complaint must be dismissed.” Order Dismissing
Complaint at 7-8 (citations omitted).
This Court’s analysis of Mr. Hill’s
perceived delay inbringing his claim is erroneous and incomplete. Mr. Hill did not
unduly delay in bringing his claim. Rather, as is explained in
his motion for temporary injunction, Mr. Hill could not have
brought his claim prior to the time his execution date was set.
In support of this position, Mr. Hill stated as follows:
E. NO UNNECESSARY DELAY IN BRINGING MR.
HILL’S CLAIM
Mr. Hill diligently pursued his claim as
soon as it ripened. His claim became ripe
when his death warrant issued, because it was
only at that point that he could ascertain
the specific means by which the State would
carry out his lethal injection.
SeeWorthington v. Missouri
, 166 S.W. 3d 566, 583n.3 (Mo. 2005). That is so because the
Department of Corrections retains complete
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 3 of 24
3
In contrast, Florida prescribes, with careful detail, thechemicals to be used in animal euthanasia and the chemicals
that are prohibited for such use (including any neuromuscular
blocking agent); a strict “order of preference” for the manner
in which the lethal solution is to be administered; the
qualifications that a person administering the lethal solution
must possess; and a 16-hour “euthanasia technician course”
that anyone administering the lethal solution must have taken.
See
Fla. Stat. 828.058. The statute goes on to detail theminimum topics that the certification course must cover
(including pharmacology, proper administration and storage of
euthanasia solutions) and the manner in which the curriculum
for the course is to be approved (by the Board of Veterinary
Medicine).
See id. at 828.058(4)(a).-4-
discretion over how lethal injections will be
carried out, and shrouds its intentions in
secrecy.
No Florida statute provides the chemical
sequence to be used, the procedures for
administering it, any qualifications or
training required for persons engaged in
administering the chemicals and monitoring
the execution, or the means of venous
access.
3 Nor does any Florida statute evenrequire that such procedures be devised
through rule-making process, or in
consultation with medical experts.
CompareFla. Stat. § 828.055 (requiring Board of
Pharmacy to adopt rules for the issuance of
permits authorizing the use of chemicals in
animal euthanasia, which “shall set forth
guidelines for the proper storage and
handling” of the chemicals); 828.058
(requiring training for animal euthanasia
technicians involving a curriculum approved
by the Board of Veterinary Medicine). And
the Department has not itself decided to
publish any definitive set of procedures
through rule-making or otherwise. The
Department, therefore, retains total
discretion to change the chemical sequence,
the manner of administration, the
qualifications and training of the execution
team, and any safeguards to ensure proper
administration and adequate anesthetic depth
at any time and with respect to any
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 4 of 24
4
The State of Florida has denied Mr. Hill any access whatsoeverto records, policies, procedures, or any other information
concerning its lethal injection protocols and procedures.
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particular execution. The State has never
disputed that the Department has total
discretion in this regard. The “central
concern” of the ripeness doctrine “is whether
the case involves uncertain or contingent
future events that may not occur as
anticipated.” Charles Alan Wright et al.,
13A
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532, at112. Accordingly, the ripeness inquiry looks
to whether a sufficiently concrete and
definitive agency policy or practice exists.
Otherwise, judicial intervention would
“den[y] the agency an opportunity to correct
is own mistakes and to apply its expertise.”
Federal Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co.
, 449U.S. 232, 242 (1980). As the Supreme Court
of the United States has explained in the
analogous context of federal administrative
review,
[T]he ripeness requirement is designed
“to prevent the courts, through avoidance
of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until
an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties.”
Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra
Club
, 523 U.S. 726,732-33 (1983).
Here, rather than promulgate a definitive
policy, DOC has retained total discretion
over its process of lethal injection. For
this reason, it was only when Mr. Hill’s
execution was imminent that he could
ascertain what execution procedures would be
applied to him. The State cannot fight tooth
and nail to resist publication of any
definitive protocol
4, and then accuse thecondemned person of inequitable conduct
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 5 of 24
5
Although Mr. Hill was not required to exhaust state-courtremedies prior to bringing his federal-court action under
§ 1983,
see Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1249 (2005),he did so out of an abundance of caution, recognizing that if
the district court were to construe his complaint as a habeas
filing, he
would have had to exhaust those judicial remedies,see
48 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The State of Florida raises theissue of the PLRA exhaustion requirements in its motion to
dismiss. Doc. 34, at 8-16. Notably, Mr. Hill’s complaint alleged
that no administrative remedies were available to him.
SeeComplaint at 17-18 and in his Amended Complaint. The PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement is not a rule of pleading the plaintiff
must satisfy. It is an affirmative defense
the defendant mustplead and prove, not appropriate for consideration under a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion where all facts must be construed
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
See Anderson, 407F.3d at 681;
Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.2003);
Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2002); Rayv. Kertes,
285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002); Foulk v. Charrier,262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001);
Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d-6-
because he must wait until his death warrant
is issued to ascertain the particular
procedures that will be used in his
execution.
Instead, the State can secure an earlier
disposition of such suits simply by
prescribing definitive practices or the
orderly adoption of rules, as it already has
done to regulate animal euthanasia. The
Department, moreover, need only implement the
familiar process of agency rule-making to
ensure that the question whether its chosen
procedures for administering lethal injection
violates the Eighth Amendment ripens before
the inmate’s date of execution is set.
Given the lack of
any constraints on theDepartment’s discretion and of any definitive
practices that would have provided the courts
with a sufficiently concrete policy to
review, Mr. Hill’s claim did not ripen until
the execution warrant issued. From the
moment that Mr. Hill’s challenge ripened, he
has diligently pursued his claim. Mr. Hill
initially filed suit in state court, in order
to defend against an argument that he had
failed to exhaust state remedies.
5 As soonCase 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 6 of 24
727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999);
Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28-29(2d Cir. 1999);
see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499(2005) (assuming that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is
waivable);
id. at 528 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing outassumption);
Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 267(D.C. Cir. 2001) (suggesting that exhaustion is an affirmative
defense). Even if this Court construes the PLRA exhaustion
requirement as a special matter that must be pled, Fed.R.Civ.P.
9(c) allows Mr. Hill to plead generally that the condition was
satisfied and a denial of performance or occurrence must be
specifically pled with particularity.
6
Mr. Hill’s claim is no different than in cases where newscientific DNA techniques were developed after those cases had
concluded. Just as in those cases where courts are reconsidering
prior rulings in light of subsequent scientific research, so
should Mr. Hill’s claim be considered in light of new scientific
evidence.
-7-
as his action was dismissed on procedural
grounds in state court, he filed his § 1983
action.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Injunction
to Stay His Execution Scheduled for September
20, 2006 at 6:00 p.m. at 28-31.
Clearly, Mr. Hill was diligent in filing his §1983 claim.
This Court’s order failed to acknowledge or specifically consider
the facts presented.
Of further note is that the study relied upon by Mr. Hill
was not published until April 2005, five years after the
Simsdecision. This study is new. It is post-
Sims.6 In addition,Taylor
and Morales are recent decisions which demonstrateexamples of how reality vastly differs from theory when grappling
with lethal injection issues. The discovery in these cases
exposed the Missouri and California procedures to be much more
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 7 of 24
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inadequate than ever imagined. As none of this information was
available at the time
Sims was decided, certainly Mr. Hill cannotbe faulted for failing to raise the issue.
Prior to
Hill v. McDonough, Eleventh Circuit precedentrefused to recognize and thereby notice condemned prisoners that
a §1983 action could be used to challenge “[m]ethod of execution”
under the Eighth Amendment. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit had
consistently ruled that Mr. Hill, and others on Florida’s death
row, “could [not] have brought” the claim contained in the
pending §1983 action. As well, the Court’s clear holding in
Robinson v. Crosby
, 358 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2004),precluded such a lawsuit. Indeed, this Court initially dismissed
Mr. Hill’s claim based upon that precedent, stating that there
was no subject matter jurisdiction for this Court to consider the
claim. It was only on January 24, 2006 – when the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari review in
Hill v. Crosby todetermine whether the Eleventh Circuit Court’s determination that
district courts lack jurisdiction to consider claims like Mr.
Hill’s was correct – that the validity of this precedent was
called into question.
The Eleventh Circuit Court’s precedent was succinctly
explained in
Hill v. Crosby:It is clear to us that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider appellant’s claim because it
is the functional equivalent of a successive habeas
petition and he failed to obtain leave of this court to
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 8 of 24
7
Harris v. Johnson, 376 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2004); White v.Johnson
, 429 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 2005); White v. Livingston,126 S.Ct. 601 (2005);
Patton v. Jones, 2006 WL 2468312 (10th Cir.Aug. 25, 2006);
Reese v. Livingston, 453 F.3d 289, 291 (5th Cir.June 20, 2006).
-9-
file it.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). And as thepanel observed in
Robinson, “such an application tofile a successive petition would be due to be denied in
any event.
See In re Provanzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1256, 120S.Ct. 2710, 147 L.Ed.2d 979 (2000) (concluding that a
claim that lethal injection constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment does not meet the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) or (B)).”
437 F.3d 1084, 1085 (11
th Cir. 2006)Thus, unlike the situation in the bevy of circuit court
cases cited by this Court
7, or even in Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Ct.For N. Dist. Cal.
503 U.S. 653, 112 S.Ct. 1652, 118 L.Ed.2d 293(1992)(per curiam), there is “good reason” in this case for the
failure to present this claim previously. According to the
binding precedent of this Court when the
Lancet study came out inApril of 2005, Mr. Hill could neither file a successive habeas
petition challenging the protocol employed by the State of
Florida for carrying out a lethal injection execution, nor a
§1983 complaint.
This precedent has now been definitively overruled.
However, it should have been considered by this Court as to
timeliness in evaluating the equities in determining whether to
enter a stay of execution under
Gomez. This Court’s failure toCase 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 9 of 24
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properly consider this precedent is in error, and relief is
warranted.
Seemingly, in its consideration of the timeliness of Mr.
Hill’s action, this Court has improperly conflated two key issues
and the appropriate analysis for each: (1) the question of
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and (2) the question of
whether to temporarily enjoin (stay) Mr. Hill’s execution. The
State of Florida based their motion to dismiss upon Rule
12(b)(6). As this Court is well aware, Rule 12(b)(6) is an
appropriate vehicle for dismissal only when the Plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Yet the
entire procedural history of this case has been about whether Mr.
Hill has stated a viable claim under §1983. See
Hill v.McDonough
, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006);Hill v. Crosby
, 437 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2006).Clearly, the United States Supreme Court found that Mr. Hill
stated a viable claim,
or it would not have remanded this cause.All that is required from Mr. Hill at this juncture is a short,
concise statement of facts.
See Rule 8. The Supreme Courtspecifically held that there are no heightened pleading
requirements in Mr. Hill’s §1983 action.
See Hill at **53. Andthe Supreme Court clearly contemplated that ripeness was not a
hinderance to Mr. Hill’s cause. As Justice Breyer stated in his
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 10 of 24
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questioning of the State of Florida during oral argument in this
cause:
And so [Mr. Hill] thinks, up until the last minute,
that maybe Florida will just do it, and lo and behold,
when the death warrant is actually executed, it now
begins to appear that they won't. And therefore, at
that time, he brings the case. Now, I've spun out a
story which seems probable, that if it's true, it would
be very understandable why this wasn't ripe before the
execution warrant is issued and thereafter it is.
Hill v. McDonough
, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44(2006), Oral Argument transcript at 29.
Mr. Hill’s complaint is timely as long as he files it within
the statute of limitations, so there is no dilatoriness or
untimeliness in the filing of the lawsuit. As the district court
stated in
Cooey v. Taft, it is illogical to require a deathsentencedplaintiff to file a §1983 action any earlier than when
his execution is “imminent”:
[Because] it appears that the [lethal injection]
protocol is subject to alteration until the time of
execution . . . requiring a death-sentenced plaintiff
to file his method-of-execution challenge any sooner
[than when his death is imminent] strikes this Court as
potentially wasteful and possibly absurd, given the
possibility that, prior to his execution becoming
imminent, a plaintiff could see his conviction or death
sentence reversed, or the alteration of the precise
execution protocol that plaintiff might seek to
challenge as unconstitutional.
Cooey v. Taft, No. 2:04-cv-1156(Doc.14, at 11).
The timeliness issue is only relevant to the propriety of a
stay under
Gomez, Nelson, and Hill. In terms of the viability ofMr. Hill’s §1983 action, there is no question that Mr. Hill was
diligent, timely, and acting in accordance with established
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 11 of 24
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precedent as he pursued this claim through the courts.
Therefore, this Court is clearly in error in dismissing Mr.
Hill’s claim on the basis of timeliness.
II. EQUITIES SHIFTED WHEN STATE OF FLORIDA MANIPULATED THE
EXECUTION DATE FOR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE
The analysis under
Gomez changed when the original executiondate was stayed on January 25, 2006. In contrast to when the
Supreme Court of the United States voted unanimously to stay this
cause and grant
certiorari, after the remand in January of 2006Mr. Hill was not initially operating under an imminent execution
date. Thirty-four days after the remand, the Governor of Florida
set an execution date to “get things going in the courts,” rather
than filing a motion for remand. This action presents a different
set of equities than what this Court considered when denying Mr.
Hill’s request to stay his execution. The State of Florida’s
action, not Mr. Hill’s, abrogated Mr. Hill’s ability to
adequately develop a factual record as requested in this cause.
The State’s actions should not unduly prejudice Mr. Hill by
preventing him from pursuing his constitutional claim to the
fullest extent of the law.
Per Governor Bush’s orders, the State of Florida did not
proceed with any further death warrants while Mr. Hill’s case was
pending. The State’s “strong interest in enforcing its criminal
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 12 of 24
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judgments . . .” (See
Hill v. McDonough at 2104) was voluntarilyand volitionally decided to be of less importance than the issues
surrounding lethal injection. However, by now resetting Mr.
Hill’s execution date, while continuing to hold all other
warrants in abeyance, the intent of the State of Florida is
obvious – kill Mr. Hill, and prevent a reasoned review of the
torturous lethal injection process currently in place.
This new execution date changes the equitable analysis when
determining whether Mr. Hill’s claim should go forward. The
State of Florida’s conduct has only served to delay and obstruct
the proper resolution of Mr. Hill’s claims. By setting an
execution date for Mr. Hill, Florida has short-circuited the
normal course of litigation – a course of litigation which was
anticipated by the United States Supreme Court when it stayed Mr.
Hill’s execution and remanded this case. The State’s action
belies its publicly stated intent of awaiting a judicial
resolution of this matter, and evinces its true intent of not
allowing a judicial review of its lethal injection procedure.
It should be noted, however, that two Supreme Court justices
recognized that the State has a responsibility to ensure that its
execution method comports with the Constitution. As Justice
Kennedy stated in oral argument in
Hill v. McDonough, “This --this is a death case. . . . Doesn't the State have some minimal
obligation under the Eighth Amendment to do the necessary
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 13 of 24
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research to assure that this is the most humane method possible?
Doesn't the State have a minimal obligation on its own to do
that?"
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165L.Ed.2d 44 (2006), Oral Argument transcript at 29.
Similarly, Justice Souter queried the assistant solicitor
general on what he believed to be the State’s duty to
investigate:
[T]he Lancet article has been out there for a while,
and it certainly is enough to suggest. . .that there is
something problematic about the manner in which Florida
proposes to do this. And yet, we have not heard a word
that Florida has made any effort whatsoever to find an
alternative or, for that matter, to – to disprove what
the Lancet article suggests.
Id. at 48.By ordering Mr. Hill to be executed on September 20, 2006, the
State of Florida is willfully disregarding the very real
possibility that Mr. Hill will be executed cruelly, painfully,
and unconstitutionally. The State’s blatant attempt to avoid
addressing this serious constitutional and civil rights issue
significantly lessens the equitable weight that would generally
be afforded a State when an execution date is imminent. This
Court should re-weigh the equities accordingly, and find that
equitable process mandates an evidentiary hearing in this cause.
III. TRUNCATED CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT DID NOT PROVIDE MR.
HILL DUE PROCESS IN LITIGATING HIS §1983 CLAIM
This Court originally had Mr. Hill’s case under warrant in
January 2006. Mr. Hill filed his claim on Friday, January 20,
2006, and the State of Florida filed their response the same day.
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 14 of 24
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The next day, Saturday, January 21, 2006, this Court dismissed
Mr. Hill’s claim, re-characterizing the claim as a successive
habeas petition and then dismissing under AEDPA. Essentially,
this Court entertained Mr. Hill’s claim in one day.
This cause was remanded to this Court pursuant to
Hill v.McDonough
, 126 S.Ct. 2096 (June 12, 2006) and Hill v. McDonough,No. 06-10621 (11
th Cir. Aug. 29, 2006), on Thursday, August 31,2006. The CM/ECF notification of the remand occurred at 12:12
p.m. on that date. Subsequently, this Court’s staff contacted
the office of undersigned counsel at approximately 1:45 p.m. to
order that all pleadings in this matter be submitted by the
following day at noon. Undersigned counsel was at the prison
visiting death row clients, including Mr. Hill, and returned
around 5:00 p.m. to receive this Court’s order. This allowed
undersigned counsel a mere 19 hours, if he chose not to sleep, to
comply with this Court’s request. The parties complied with this
Court’s order and filed their pleadings by noon on September 1,
2006. In less than seven hours, this Court denied Mr. Hill’s
request for a preliminary temporary injunction staying the
execution – even though the execution was still nineteen days
away. This Court’s consideration and rejection of Mr. Hill’s
claims in such a short time span is not the process which Mr.
Hill is due.
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 15 of 24
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The guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law is a fundamental
constitutional right that applies to both federal and state
governmental actors through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. The Due Process Clause applies to
federal courts,
Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 165(2002), and it applies in civil as well as criminal proceedings,
e.g. Honda Motor Co. V. Oberg
, 512 U.S. 415, 430-435 (1994). Ithas been long established that “[a]n elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency
of the action and to afford them an opportunity” to present their
case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950). Mr. Hill has been unjustly denied an opportunity to
present his case. The process which he is due would allow him to
present his evidence and demonstrated the unconstitutionally
cruel punishment which he faces, not a summary dismissal.
The Supreme Court of the United States contemplated more
when it held that district courts should decide the equities of a
stay in the first instance.
See Gomez, 503 U.S. 653, 112 S.Ct.1652, 118 L.Ed.2d 293 (1992)(per curiam);
Nelson v. Campbell, 541U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004);
Hill v.McDonough,
126 S.Ct. 2096 (June 12, 2006). In this case, theCase 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 16 of 24
-17-
efficacy of a stay would have been more appropriately determined
after assessing the discovery requests submitted by Mr. Hill
subject to the expediting of the discovery process. Instead,
this Court gave the parties less than twenty-four hours to
present their claims, and then rendered judgment on the pleadings
without the benefit of discovery. This truncated process was
utilized even though nineteen days were left before Mr. Hill’s
scheduled execution.
The nature of Mr. Hill’s case demands that he be granted a
full and fair evidentiary hearing both as to the efficacy of the
stay and the merits of his claims. An evidentiary hearing is
necessary to make certain that Mr. Hill will not be subjected to
an unconstitutionally cruel punishment, as well as to ensure
public legitimacy as the State of Florida carries out his
sentence. The highly specific factual claims advanced by Mr.
Hill plainly cannot be properly litigated without a meaningful
opportunity for discovery. This Court’s order dismissing Mr.
Hill’s claims effectively prejudges Mr. Hill’s claims as
factually meritless. That type of prejudging is highly improper
in any case, but is even more inappropriate in an Eighth
Amendment challenge to a specific means of execution.
IV. THIS CLAIM SHOULD HAVE GONE FORWARD EVEN IF STAY NOT GRANTED
Absent the unique and unusual circumstances of these
proceedings, Mr. Hill would indisputably have been entitled to
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 17 of 24
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more time to prepare and present his case. As a result of this
Court’s ruling, Mr. Hill has been denied the opportunity to
utilize the tools of discovery, as well as the opportunity to
conduct further factual investigation into such matters as
whether Florida has a history of botched executions similar to
California. See
Morales v. Hickman, 2006 WL 335427 (N.D. Cal.,Feb. 14, 2006)
reviewed at Morales v. Hickman, 2006 WL 391604(9
th Cir., 2006); Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS42949, 22 (June 26, 2006). In any lawsuit, much less one that is
as intensely specific and factually intensive as a challenge to
the State’s manner of execution, a rush to judgment runs contrary
to the basic dictates of due process.
Dismissal of a claim is the harshest of remedies and should
not have been ordered in this cause. Mr. Hill should have been
allowed to continue in his claim to the point of his execution,
even if this Court chose not to enter a stay. Mr. Hill could
have proceeded with his requested discovery and presumably
discovered information further supporting his claim and changing
the equities relative to a stay. At this point Mr. Hill has been
unjustly denied that opportunity.
Mr. Hill promptly sought discovery upon remand by filing
numerous discovery requests within twenty-four hours of this
cause being remanded, i.e. admissions, production,
interrogatories, etc. Additionally, he promptly sought a stay of
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 18 of 24
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his execution from this Court, again within twenty-four hours, in
an attempt to ensure his ability to participate in discovery.
This Court’s order that all pleadings be submitted in this
cause within twenty-four hours of the remand, and its subsequent
dismissal of this cause the same day, eliminated Mr. Hill’s
ability to participate in discovery. The prejudice inuring from
this Court’s action is manifest. If Mr. Hill had been given even
minimal discovery and the opportunity to obtain the execution
logs and other key records, he presumably could have produced
direct evidence to prove his claims. The
Morales case provesinstructive in this regard. In
Morales, records regarding lethalinjection procedures in California documented a pattern of
mistakes, complications and blunders that discredited
California’s claim that five grams of thiopental would quickly
render an inmate unconscious.
See Morales at 2006 WL 335427 at*6 (“[E]vidence from Defendants’ own execution logs [shows] that
the inmates’ breathing may not have ceased as expected in at
least six out of thirteen executions by lethal injection in
California.”). As a result of Morales’ opportunity for discovery
and the presentation of evidence, he was able to discount the
testimony about the theoretical efficacy of thiopental in the
face of real world evidence.
Id. at *5-6.Mr. Hill was seeking, and would have obtained, the same type
of information regarding execution protocols. Florida’s margin
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 19 of 24
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for error is significantly lower then California’s, as the State
Department of Corrections purportedly uses only two grams of
thiopental.
See Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2000).Therefore, it is even more likely that real world mistakes,
mishaps, and complications would belie Florida’s assertions as to
the legitimacy and constitutionality of its lethal injection
procedure. A prisoner need not take on faith the statement by
prison officials that his execution will be constitutionally
compliant, and a condemned prisoner has the right to know how his
execution will be conducted. “Fundamental fairness, if not due
process, requires that the execution protocol that will regulate
an inmate’s death be forwarded to him in a prompt and timely
fashion.”
Oken v. Sizer, 321 F.Supp. 658, 664 (D. Md.2004)(considering rights of condemned inmate to review suddenly
changed protocol)(considering constitutionality of lethal
injection protocols in Maryland and collecting case),
stayvacated
, 124 S.Ct. 2868 (2004); cf. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S.110, 126 n.22 (1991)(noting that when the threatened loss is
great, as when death is the result, the need for notice is even
more pronounced than in other settings). For that right to have
meaning, Mr. Hill must be allowed to challenge an execution
protocol that will subject him to the unconscionable likelihood
that he will suffer unnecessarily and inhumanely.
Cf. Mullane v.Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 20 of 24
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No injustice would have occurred had this Court allowed a
sufficiently brief period of time for discovery and an
adjudication of Mr. Hill’s claims. On the contrary, permitting
Mr. Hill the opportunity for expedited discovery and time to
fully develop his claims would have only increased the legitimacy
of these proceedings and allowed this Court to make a decision
after a full and fair hearing. Florida’s acknowledged interest
in promptly carrying out Mr. Hill’s sentence cannot override the
fundamental due process requirement that a litigant such as Mr.
Hill be given a basic adequate opportunity to develop and present
his claims. Mr. Hill is entitled to die with dignity, consistent
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. Neither the State
of Florida nor this Court can deny Mr. Hill a meaningful
opportunity to make his case.
This Court could have easily denied the stay and allowed Mr.
Hill’s claim to proceed with expedited discovery as he requested.
The case of
Patton v. Jones is illustrative of the efficacy andvalue of this process, as are
Morales and Taylor. See Patton v.Jones
, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54429 (Okla. W.D. Aug. 4, 2006)affirmed, stay denied, Patton v. Jones
, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS22312 (10
th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006), Patton v. Jones, petitiondenied, stay denied,
2006 U.S. LEXIS 5379 (Aug.29, 2006);Morales v. Hickman
, 2006 WL 335427 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 14, 2006)reviewed at Morales v. Hickman
, 2006 WL 391604 (9th Cir., 2006);Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 21 of 24
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Taylor v. Crawford
, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42949, 22 (June 26,2006). All of these cases are recent and involved lethal
injection claims where the courts denied a stay and allowed the
proceedings to continue. In these cases a determination on the
merits was made in a very limited amount of time, and enough
discovery and testimony were adduced to allow meaningful
consideration to be given to the plaintiffs’ claims.
For example, the docket sheet in
Patton reveals that theplaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 28,
2006, and a hearing on that motion was held on August 8, 2006.
At the hearing, the State of Oklahoma introduced a new protocol
in response to plaintiff’s claims, and the Court ruled that the
protocol extant at the time the lawsuit was filed was
unconstitutional; however, the new protocol was ruled to have
sufficiently addressed plaintiff’s concerns regarding the
constitutionality of the method of execution. See
Patton v.Jones
, Case No. 5:06-cv-00591-F, Docket Report & Doc. 25.Mr. Hill previously detailed the proceedings in
Taylor andMorales
in his request for a preliminary temporary injunction andwill incorporate those facts by reference. Clearly, these cases
demonstrate that it is possible to litigate and resolve lethal
injection issues quickly. It is incorrect for this Court to
assume that the parties cannot address Mr. Hill’s claims prior to
his September 20, 2006 execution date. Most importantly, it is a
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 22 of 24
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blatant denial of due process to not even attempt to allow him to
present his claims.
WHEREFORE
, Mr. Hill respectfully requests this Courtreconsider its Order Dismissing Complaint, deny Defendant’s
Amended Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action
Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted; and Response and Memorandum of
Law to Request for Stay or Injunction, issue a temporary
injunction staying Mr. Hill’s execution, order expedited
discovery, and allow Mr. Hill’s § 1983 action to be fully and
fairly litigated without an imminent execution date looming.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ D. Todd Doss
D. TODD DOSS
Florida Bar No. 0910384
725 Southeast Baya Drive
Suite 102
Lake City, FL 32025-6092
Telephone (386) 755-9119
Facsimile (386) 755-3181
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served
on the following counsel via electronic filing on this 5
th day ofSeptember 2006.
/s/ D. Todd Doss
D. TODD DOSS
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 23 of 24
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Copies furnished to:
Carolyn Snurkowski
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Plaza Level 1
The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399
Case 4:06-cv-00032-SPM Document 43-1 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 24 of 24